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Abstract 
This paper explores the effects of price limits on the stock market of China during global 
market turmoils. The characteristics of stocks that hit the price limits more frequently under 
market turmoil are investigated. It is found that the price limit system increases volatility 
significantly during the downward price movement. Moreover, price limit delays the efficient 
price discovery for upward and downward price movements. Finally, actively-traded stocks 
with a higher positive correlation with the entire market in the property industry hit the price 
limits more frequently.  
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1. Introduction 
Price limits are literal boundaries set by authorities as a maximum range of upward and 
downward daily price movements aiming to provide a cooling-off period for investors during 
panic trading. Setting price limits is a policy aims to restrict extreme daily security price 
movements in the stock market. The introduction of price limits in the US was provoked by 
the market crash in October 1987, which led to discussions regarding the implementation of a 
market circuit breaker system. The New York Stock Exchange established the price limit 
mechanism to prevent the reoccurrence of market crashes. Today, such a mechanism has been 
widely adapted in Japan, Thailand, France, Korea, Malaysia and China. For instance, in 
Malaysia, the daily price limit of upward stocks is 69%, while that of the downward stocks is 
51%. In China, price limits of both upward and downward stocks are 10%. 
Although price limits have already been implemented in numerous countries, empirical 
research on the price limit remains scarce because of practical difficulties. Chiang at el. (1990) 
show that with price limits, the OLS estimation of systematic risk is biased. In addition, it is 
relatively difficult to obtain data on hitting limits with a reasonable sample size (Kim and 
Limpaphayom 2000). Existing studies provide mixed results on the impact of price limit. 
Some studies argue that price limits can moderate excessive volatility, mitigate panic 
behavior, or minimize price manipulation (Kim 2001, Kim and Park 2010, Kim and Rhee 
1997, Kim and Yang 2004), while others criticize that price limits impede market efficiency, 
and cannot achieve their intended objectives of reducing the extreme market fluctuation. 
Fama (1989) argues that price limits have volatility spillover effects, delay price discovery 
and interfere with trading in the US market. Lee and Kim (1995) find that price limits reduce 
3 
 
price volatility in the Korean stock market, while Berkman and Lee (2002) suggest that the 
effects of price limits would change with different levels of volatility and trading volumes.  
Previous studies on price limits rarely attempted to investigate the Chinese stock market. 
The Chinese stock market has been playing an increasingly important role in the global 
financial market. The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) have been growing rapidly over the past two decades. In 1990, the Chinese 
government first enacted the price limit policy for both upward and downward price 
movements to prevent potential social instability by negative influences of the financial 
market. The policy was once abolished in 1992 but resumed on December 16, 1996. The 
policy allows the price of a stock to only move by ±10% of the closing price from the 
previous trading day. An exception is for newly listed stocks in their first public trading day 
or first trading day after resumption, where ±20% price changes are allowed. Besides, bad 
performing firms will be assigned the special treatment (ST) status and imposes a tighter 
price limit of ±5% daily. In contrast to other countries where trading ceases after stocks hit 
the limits, SHZE and SZSE allow trading to continue but only at prices within the required 
range. If a stock hits its price limits for three consecutive days, it will be suspended for half a 
trading day until an explanation is provided.  
Previous studies on the effect of price limits on the Chinese stock market focused on 
tranquil periods (Chen et al. 2005). The Chinese stock market has been increasingly affected 
by global financial crises as it open up its economy to the world. In this paper, we examine 
the effects of price limits in China during two global crises, namely, the Asian financial crisis 
(from July 1997 to December 1998) and the 2008 financial crisis (from August 2008 to 
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December 2009). In particular, we aim to test the hypotheses of volatility spillover, delayed 
price discovery, and trading interference during such periods. We will also investigate the 
attributes of stocks that easily hit their price limits during market turmoils.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
tests the effects of the price limit policy on the Chinese stock market during market turmoils. 
Section 4 investigates the attributes of stocks frequently hitting the price limits during market 
turmoils, and Section 5 concludes the findings of the study. 
 
2. Data  
We extract the daily A-share stock prices and trading volume data of both SZSE and 
SHZE from the CSMAR database. After eliminating those ST stocks and adjusting the effects 
of stock dividends, stock placing and ex-dividend, we obtain the final sample. Without 
directly detecting price hitting, we have to identify the occurrences of hitting prices by 
examining the daily open, low, high, and closing prices.  
Table 1 reports the numbers of the Chinese A-share stocks hitting the price limits in three 
different periods. From 1997 to 2009, the number of price limit hits increases, indicating that 
the stock market has become progressively active. Furthermore, in all of the three periods, the 
upward price limits occupy a similar proportion of approximately 70%, which outshines the 
percentage of downward price limits. Therefore, regardless of tranquil or crisis periods, 
investors in China tend be exuberant when a firm has positive news, while they tend to be 
cautious and rational when the news is negative. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Price Limit Hits 
  Total Upward % Downward % 
No. of 
Listed 
Companies
Asian Financial 
Crisis 
(1997–1998) 
1405 1009 71.8% 396 28.2% 827 
Tranquil Period 
(2004–2006) 
5520 4065 73.6% 1455 26.4% 1459 
2008 Financial 
Crisis 
(2008–2009) 
8992 6508 72.3% 2484 27.7% 1725 
This table shows the respective numbers of total price limit hits for all stocks within the three respective 
periods and the corresponding percentages of upper and lower price limits. Upward and Downward 
columns indicate the subsamples that hit price limits during the upward and downward movements, 
respectively.  
 
 To determine the attributes of stocks that tend to hit price limits during market turmoil, we 
examine the financial ratios of each individual stock, including the book-to-market value, 
total market capitalization, beta, the turnover ratio, residual risk, and the percentage of 
state-own shares. In addition, we introduce the state-owned factor and industry factor in our 
model. In accordance with the industry categories in SZSE and SHZE, the industries of 
A-share stocks can be divided into the following six groups: finance, utilities, properties, 
conglomerates, industrials and commerce. These factors are the candidate attributes of the 
stocks that easily hit the price limits. 
In this paper, we select stocks with close price limit hits. In contrast to previous studies, we 
utilize the one-day price limit hits and consecutive limit hits.  
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Table 2. Statistics of Consecutive Price Limit Hits 
 
Total 
Hits 
1 Day 
2 
Consecutive 
Days 
3 
Consecutive 
Days 
4 
Consecutive 
Days 
5 
Consecutive 
Days 
Asian 
Financial 
Crisis 
(1997–1998) 
1405 
1242 68 7 0 0 
88.4% 9.7% 1.9% 0% 0% 
Tranquil 
Period 
(2004–2006) 
5520 
4381 420 65 26 0 
79.4% 15.2% 3.5% 1.9% 0% 
2008 
Financial 
Crisis 
(2008–2009) 
8992 
7394 571 84 26 0 
82.2% 12.7% 2.8% 1.3% 0% 
  This table shows the respective numbers of total consecutive price limit hits for all stocks within  
  the three respective periods. 
 
Table 2 shows the numbers of one-time and consecutive price limit hits for three periods with 
the corresponding percentages of these price limits. The percentage of consecutive price 
limits hits is calculated as the number of price limit hits over the total number of hits. For 
example, in the Asian financial crisis, the percentage of two consecutive price limit hits is 
calculated as 68*2/1405=9.7%. Since the stock will be suspended for half a day if it hits the 
limit for three consecutive days, the case of a five consecutive-day hitting only happens if the 
stock also hits the limit in the next half day and the fifth day. From the absolute number and 
percentage, we can observe that the number of consecutive price limit hits is noticeable. As 
shown in Table 2, in both financial crises, the consecutive price limit hits take up over 10% of 
the total hits, which is nontrivial and cannot be deleted from the sample. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
   There are three problems associated with price limits, namely volatility spillover (Fama 
1989), delayed price discovery (Fama 1989) and trading interference (Lauterbach and 
Ben-Zion 1993). We test the following hypotheses in this paper: 
 
Volatility Spillover Hypothesis: Price limits cause volatility to be spread out over a long 
period instead of occurring within a single day; thus, such limits do not actually reduce 
volatility.  
 
Delayed Price Discovery Hypothesis: Positive (negative) overnight returns are observed on 
stocks that hit their upper (lower) limits. 
 
Trading Inference Hypothesis: If price limits interfere with the trading process, we expect an 
increase in trading activity for stocks that hits the limit after the price limit hitting day, and a 
decrease or stabilization in trading activity for other stocks. 
 
3.1 Test of the Volatility Spillover Hypothesis 
The primary purpose of price limits is to reduce the volatility by controlling extreme price 
movements of stocks. However, previous studies have suggested that the underlying volatility 
of stocks increase when the price discovery process is interrupted by price limit hits. Fama 
(1989), Kuhn, Kurserk, and Locke (1991), and Lehmann (1989) study the volatility spillover 
hypothesis. Instead of having a sudden jump or drop in a single trading day, price limits may 
spread the volatility over a long period (Lehmann 1989). Price limits have been found to be 
ineffective in reducing volatility in the Tokyo, Taiwan and Thailand stock exchange markets 
(Kim, 2001; Kim and Rhee, 1997). Chen et al. (2005) also showed that price limits are 
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ineffective in reducing volatility in the Chinese A-share markets in the period from 1997 to 
2003. 
We use hitStock  to denote the stocks that hit their price limits. 0.9hitStock  represents the 
stocks that experience price change by at least 90% of their price limits but do not reach the 
limits. 0.8hitStock  denotes those stocks with price change by at least 80% but do not reach 90% 
of their price limits. In China, price limits are set at ±10%. We construct a 21-day window to 
test volatility spillover. The volatility spillover hypothesis is supported if the stocks have 
higher volatility after the day they hit the price limits than other common stocks. We divide 
the 21-day window into three groups, namely, the first 10 days (Day -10), Day 0, and the last 
10 days (Day +10). Day 0 is the day when the price limit is hit, Day -1 represents the day 
before the stocks hit the price limit, and Day +1 denotes the day after the hitting day, and so 
forth. We then compute the volatility for each day in the 21-day window for all the stock 
groups (i.e., hitStock , 0.9hitStock and 0.8hitStock ).  
Following Fama (1989) and Chen et al. (2005), we define the volatility of return as  
                                                              (1) 
 
where , , 1,ln(C / C )t j t j t jr  is the daily return of stock j on Day t, ,t jC  is the close price of 
stock j on Day t. We compare volatility after the hitting day for the three stock groups 
respectively to generate implications about volatility spillover based on our previous 
assumption. If volatility spillover exists, shares in hitStock are expected to have higher 
volatility than the other two groups (i.e., 0.9hitStock  and 0.8hitStock ) after Day 0.  
Tables 3, 4 and 5 report volatility of the three stock categories over the Asian financial 
2
, ,( )t j t jV r
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crisis (1997 to 1998), the 2008 financial crisis (2008 to 2009), and the tranquil period (2004 
to 2006), respectively. To eliminate the high pre-limit day volatility bias, we exclude the 
sample observations that a stock hits a price limit for the second or third consecutive day. The 
stock categories are based on the magnitude of their price movements on the event day of a 
21-day window. Day 0 represents the day when Hit reach the price limits. 0.9Hit denotes 
stocks that experience a price change of at least 9% from the previous day’s close, but do not 
reach the price limit on Day 0. 0.8Hit denotes stocks that experience a price change of 
between 8% and 9%. Daily squared returns times 100 are used as the volatility measure. The 
symbols “>>” and “>” indicate that the left-hand figure is greater than the right-hand figure at 
the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively under the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests.  
 
The three groups experience the highest volatility on Day 0 when the largest price changes 
take place. After Day 0, the volatility is reduced substantially. Note that on Day 0, hitStock  
has a higher volatility than 0.9hitStock , which in turn has a higher volatility than 0.8hitStock  
with a significance level of α=0.05. This result holds across all three sample periods. The 
volatility of hitStock  having an average value of 9.1 across three different samples is almost 
40% higher than the other two comparison groups of stocks not hitting the limit for the 
upward price movement. For the downward price movement, the difference between the limit 
hitting stocks and the 80% hit group is even larger. The limit hitting stocks report an average 
volatility of 11.1 on Day 0 across the three samples, whereas the volatility of 0.8hitStock  have 
average value of 7.8 that is 42% lower than the ones from limit hitting stocks.  
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Note from Table 3 that during the Asian financial crisis, the volatility of the stocks in all 
the three groups drop sharply after Day 0. Horizontally compared with the other two groups 
with upward price movements, except for Day 1, the volatility measures of hitStock  on the 
remaining 9 days are not significantly higher than those of 0.9hitStock . As the control group 
without hitting price limits, 0.9hitStock  has significantly higher volatility than 0.8hitStock  in 
upward price movement. In the case of downward price movements, the volatility of hitStock  
is significantly lower than those of 0.9hitStock  and 0.8hitStock  on Day 1 and Day 4. On Day 
1, the volatility of hitStock  is 2.345 compared to 3.026 and 3.343 from 0.9hitStock  and 
0.8hitStock , respectively. Therefore, during the Asian financial crisis, the price limit system 
reduced volatility significantly in horizontal comparison, especially in the downward 
movement case. The result is different from that of Chen et al. (2005).  
Note from Table 4 that during the 2008 financial crisis, the volatility measures of hitStock  
are significantly higher than those of 0.9hitStock  and 0.8hitStock  at the 1% level of 
significance. The increase in volatility after Day 0 is more obvious in the downward than in 
the upward price movement when we consider the number of days with significantly higher 
volatility after Day 0. hitStock  has higher volatility than 0.9hitStock  for 7 out of the ten days 
including Day 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 9 after the stocks hitting the price limit during downward 
price movement. In contrast, the upward price movement reports a higher volatility on four 
separate days (Day 1, 2, 6, and 10) after the price limit hit. In addition, it is important to note 
that average volatility before the hit ranges from as low as 1.507 on Day -6 to 2.619 on Day 
-1 for upward price movement. The volatility remains high for the first two days after Day 0 
having values hovering around 2.829 and 2.940 which are also larger than the normal daily 
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volatility in any of the ten days preceding the hit. Therefore, the imposition of price limit 
significantly increases the volatility of the A-share market. This result is different from Chen 
et al. (2005), who show that the price limit mechanism is effective in reducing volatility in 
the Chinese A-share bearish markets for upward price movements.  
Table 5 shows the result of the tranquil period from 2004 to 2006. Note that the volatility 
of hitStock  does not increase significantly, except for Day 1, for the downward price 
movement. For upward price movement, the volatility is significantly higher than that of 
0.9hitStock  on Day 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, during the tranquil period, the price limit reduces 
the volatility for downward price movements, but not for upward price movements. This is 
consistent with Chen et al. (2005) and agrees with the presumption that investors tend to 
overreact to good news and act cautiously to bad news when the market is growing stably. 
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Table 3.Volatility Spillover Hypothesis Test on the 1997 to 1998 Stock Sample 
Stock Sample during the Asian Financial Crisis (1997 to 1998) 
Upward Price Movement  Downward Price Movement 
Day Window Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit  Day Window Hit  0.9 Hit  
0.8 
Hit 
-10 1.195  1.084  1.077  -10 0.780 < 0.889  0.887 
-9 1.117  1.083 > 0.957  -9 1.033  0.730 << 0.949 
-8 1.092  1.239 >> 1.017  -8 0.775  0.862  0.878 
-7 1.347  1.181  1.157  -7 0.725 << 0.928  0.933 
-6 1.026  1.106  1.001  -6 1.101 < 1.081  1.104 
-5 1.150  1.239  0.978  -5 1.451 > 1.233 > 1.021 
-4 1.223  1.152  1.158  -4 1.307 >> 0.993 > 0.857 
-3 1.548  1.499  1.327  -3 1.367 >> 1.024 > 0.880 
-2 1.731 < 2.118  2.058  -2 0.894  0.749 < 0.846 
-1 2.229  2.177 >> 1.710  -1 2.354 << 2.686 > 2.451 
0 9.125 >> 8.573 >> 6.595  0 11.142 >> 10.419 >> 7.846 
1 2.206 > 1.879 >> 1.210  1 2.345 << 3.026  3.343 
2 1.588  1.500 >> 1.153  2 3.335 > 2.925 >> 1.910 
3 1.479  1.388 >> 1.057  3 1.646  1.366 >> 0.975 
4 1.359  1.300 >> 1.013  4 1.057 < 1.138  1.153 
5 1.244  1.192 > 1.018  5 0.956  0.845 < 1.029 
6 1.078  1.196 > 1.020  6 0.749  0.643  0.636 
7 1.190  1.282  1.003  7 0.857 >> 0.690  0.677 
8 1.228  1.105  1.026  8 0.883 > 0.867 >> 0.851 
9 1.164  1.029 > 0.828  9 0.835  0.914  0.849 
10 1.062  1.031  0.912  10 0.851 > 0.831  0.769 
Total 
Observations 
1009  1009  805  
Total 
Observations 
396  709  551 
Note: The stock categories are based on the magnitude of their price movements on the event day of a 
21-day window. Day 0 represents the day when Hit reach the price limits. 0.9Hit denotes stocks that 
experience a price change of at least 9% from the previous day’s close, but do not reach the price limit on 
Day 0. 0.8Hit denotes stocks that experience a price change of between 8% and 9%. Daily squared returns 
times 100 are used as the volatility measure. >> and > indicate significantly greater than at the 1% and 5% 
significance levels respectively under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
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Table 4.Volatility Spillover Hypothesis Test on the 2008 to 2009 Stock Sample 
Stock Sample during the 2008 Financial Crisis (2008 to 2009) 
Upward Price Movement  Downward Price Movement 
Day 
Window 
Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit  
Day 
Window 
Hit  0.9 Hit  
0.8 
Hit 
-10 1.717  1.848 << 2.008  -10 2.508  2.511 >> 2.297 
-9 1.900 >> 1.741 >> 1.566  -9 2.068  1.949 >> 1.729 
-8 2.181  2.242  2.310  -8 2.146  2.168 > 2.022 
-7 1.930 << 2.296 << 2.647  -7 2.329  2.242 >> 1.981 
-6 1.507 < 1.586 < 1.673  -6 3.249 >> 2.627 >> 2.214 
-5 1.670  1.645  1.509  -5 2.589 > 2.255 >> 1.852 
-4 1.718  1.772 < 1.806  -4 2.309 >> 2.189  2.048 
-3 1.996  1.998  1.774  -3 2.158  2.042 >> 1.880 
-2 2.210 << 2.404  2.373  -2 2.361 > 2.306  2.320 
-1 2.619  2.592 >> 1.994  -1 2.299 >> 2.066 >> 1.762 
0 9.150 >> 8.730 >> 6.585  0 11.164 >> 10.372 >> 7.825 
1 2.829 >> 2.455 >> 1.750  1 2.494 >> 2.081 >> 1.720 
2 2.940 >> 2.496 >> 1.687  2 2.699 >> 2.331 >> 1.758 
3 2.131  2.098 > 1.825  3 2.011 >> 1.839 >> 1.764 
4 1.954 << 2.112  2.071  4 2.367  2.207 >> 1.843 
5 1.859  1.842  1.710  5 1.254 > 1.191  1.207 
6 2.082 >> 1.995  2.007  6 1.942 > 1.813 >> 1.594 
7 1.755 < 1.822  1.815  7 1.845 < 1.993  1.995 
8 1.698  1.686  1.571  8 2.046  2.046  2.108 
9 1.732  1.740  1.594  9 1.885 >> 1.704  1.525 
10 2.314 > 2.172 >> 1.618  10 2.402  2.342 >> 1.956 
Total 
Observations 
6508  5891  3031  
Total 
Observations
2484  5631  4009 
Note: The stock categories are based on the magnitude of their price movements on the event day of a 
21-day window. Day 0 represents the day when Hit reach the price limits. 0.9Hit denotes stocks that 
experience a price change of at least 9% from the previous day’s close, but do not reach the price limit on 
Day 0. 0.8Hit denotes stocks that experience a price change of between 8% and 9%. Daily squared returns 
times 100 are used as the volatility measure. >> and > indicate significantly greater than at the 1% and 5% 
significance levels respectively under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
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Table 5. Volatility Spillover Hypothesis Test on the 2004 -2006 Sample 
Stock Sample in the Tranquil Period (2004 to 2006) 
Upward Price Movement  Downward Price Movement 
Day Window Hit  
0.9 
Hit 
 0.8 Hit  Day Window Hit  0.9 Hit  
0.8 
Hit 
-10 1.231  1.350  1.329  -10 1.886  1.561 >> 1.237 
-9 1.370 > 1.290 >> 1.142  -9 1.469  1.557 >> 1.155 
-8 1.471  1.468 >> 1.186  -8 1.312  1.232 > 1.154 
-7 1.426  1.452 >> 1.138  -7 1.375  1.352 > 1.210 
-6 1.401 > 1.350 > 1.141  -6 1.665  1.476 > 1.491 
-5 1.443  1.527 >> 1.132  -5 2.354  1.813 >> 1.512 
-4 1.646  1.792 >> 1.272  -4 2.383  1.888 >> 1.390 
-3 1.888  1.581 > 1.281  -3 1.871  1.534 >> 1.415 
-2 1.951 > 1.720 >> 1.306  -2 1.953  1.749 > 1.522 
-1 2.717 > 2.372 >> 1.435  -1 2.145  2.028  1.693 
0 9.172 >> 8.731 >> 6.596  0 11.186 >> 10.406 >> 7.825 
1 2.903 >> 2.584 >> 1.366  1 2.595 >> 1.802 >> 1.236 
2 2.378 >> 2.091 >> 1.570  2 1.945  1.564 >> 1.146 
3 2.240 >> 1.865 >> 1.367  3 1.485  1.366 >> 1.126 
4 2.162  2.043 >> 1.516  4 1.790  1.409  1.193 
5 2.151  1.903 >> 1.439  5 1.597  1.529 >> 1.250 
6 2.042  2.108 >> 1.463  6 1.405  1.250  1.136 
7 1.756  1.808 > 1.338  7 1.468  1.210  1.122 
8 1.884  1.675 > 1.334  8 1.282  1.142 > 1.007 
9 1.679  1.468 >> 1.179  9 1.171  1.136  1.023 
10 1.603 > 1.472 >> 1.242  10 1.549 > 1.315 > 1.134 
Total 
Observations 
4065  3634  2030  
Total 
Observations 
1455  2759  2067 
Note: The stock categories are based on the magnitude of their price movements on the event day of a 
21-day window. Day 0 represents the day when Hit reach the price limits. 0.9Hit denotes stocks that 
experience a price change of at least 9% from the previous day’s close, but do not reach the price limit on 
Day 0. 0.8Hit denotes stocks that experience a price change of between 8% and 9%. Daily squared returns 
times 100 are used as the volatility measure. >> and > indicate significantly greater than at the 1% and 5% 
significance levels respectively under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
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3.2 Test of the Delayed Price Discovery Hypothesis 
Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) study the delayed price discovery hypothesis, which states 
that trading often halts when shares reach their price limits, consequently deterring the 
discovery of the intrinsic value. In other words, price limits prevent share prices from moving 
smoothly in one trading day to reach the equilibrium price (intrinsic value). Once price limits 
stop the movements of share prices, the share prices continue their movements in the 
following period (at least for one trading day) to reach the equilibrium price. Kim and Rhee 
(1997) find that price limits delay an effective price discovery process in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. Huang, Fu and Ke (2001) suggest that the opening price in the following day after 
reaching the limits is partially affected by overreaction. 
To identify price continuation and reversal a day after a price limit is hit, following 
previous studies, we examine the daytime or open-to-close returns r ( ௧ܱܥ௧) ≡ ln(ܥ௧/ ௧ܱ) and 
the overnight or close-to-open returns r(ܥ௧ܱ௧ାଵ )≡ln( ௧ܱାଵ/ܥ௧ ). In these equations, ௧ܱ 
and	ܥ௧	denote opening and closing prices respectively, and t represents the day. Specifically, 
we examine r(ܱ଴ܥ଴) and r(ܥ଴ ଵܱ) for all stock categories where the first measure considers the 
daytime return for Day 0, and the second measure considers the immediate following 
overnight return. Stock returns can be positive, negative, or zero, denoted as (+), (−) and (0), 
respectively. Nine cases are observed, namely, [+,+], [+, 0], [+,−], [0,+], [0, 0], [0,−], [−,+], 
[−, 0] and [−,−] where the first and second returns represent r(ܱ଴ܥ଴) and r(ܥ଴ ଵܱ), respectively. 
For upper limit hits, we classify [+,+] and [0,+] as price continuation, [+,−], [0,−], [−,+], [−, 
0], and [−,−] as price reversal, and [+, 0] and [0,0] as no change. For lower limit hits, we 
classify [−,−] and [0,−] as price continuation, [−,+], [0,+], [+,−], [+, 0], and [+,+]as price 
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reversal, and [−, 0] and [0, 0] as no change.  
Price continuation is consistent with the delayed informed trading hypothesis of Roll 
(1989), whereas the price reversal phenomenon is in line with overreaction implied by Ma, 
Rao and Sears (1989). We can only conclude that price limits delay the price discovery 
process when abnormally large percentages of price continuation for hitStock  relative to 
0.9hitStock  and 0.8hitStock  are observed. Table 6 presents the total percentages of price 
continuation, reversal and no change for each stock group in different time periods. Note that 
stocks hitting the limits have dominant percentages of continuation rather than reversal in the 
three periods. Stocks hitting upper limit report 83.1%, 70.9% and 71.5% of continuation price 
movement for the Asian crisis, the 2008 financial crisis, and the tranquil trading period, 
respectively. The percentage difference between continuation and reversal ranges from the 
smallest value of 47.1% for the case of 2008 financial crisis to as high as 72.3% for the case 
of Asian crisis. The difference between continuation and no change is even larger with next 
day price movement being classified as no change always having the lowest percentages. In 
comparison, stocks not hitting the upper price limit, 0.8hitStock , was dominated by price 
reversal having values of 67.3% for the 2008 financial crisis and 58.9% for the tranquil 
trading period. The same conclusion can be made for the downward price movement. This 
result demonstrates that the price limit delays the efficient price discovery for upward and 
downward price movements.  
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Table 6. Delayed Price Discovery Hypothesis Test 
The Asian Financial Crisis (1997 to 1998) 
Upward Price Movement  Downward Price Movement 
Price Trend Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit  Price Trend Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit 
Continuation 0.831   0.621   0.482  Continuation 0.864  0.673   0.526 
No Change 0.061   0.090   0.150  No Change 0.045  0.052   0.082 
Reversal 0.108   0.288   0.368  Reversal 0.091  0.275   0.392 
The 2008 Financial Crisis (2008 to 2009) 
Price Trend Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit  Price Trend Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit 
Continuation 0.709   0.520   0.271  Continuation 0.822  0.706   0.599 
No Change 0.053   0.056   0.056  No Change 0.056  0.073   0.089 
Reversal 0.238   0.424   0.673  Reversal 0.122  0.221   0.312 
The Tranquil Period (2004 to 2006) 
Price Trend Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit  Price Trend Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit 
Continuation 0.715   0.558   0.248  Continuation 0.910  0.788   0.642 
No Change 0.109   0.113   0.163  No Change 0.054  0.107   0.174 
Reversal 0.176   0.329   0.589  Reversal 0.036  0.105   0.185  
This table reports the total proportions of continuation, reversal, and no change for each stock subgroup in 
the three time periods. Stocks are categorized into three groups based on the magnitude of their price 
movement on Day 0 (the event day). Hit represents stocks that reach their daily price limit. 0.9Hit denotes stocks that experience a price change of at least 90%from the previous closing day, but do not reach the 
price limit. 0.8Hit denotes stocks that experience a price change between 80% and 90%. 
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3.3 Test of the Trading Interference Hypothesis 
Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993) and Fama (1989) investigate the trading interference 
hypothesis. According to the trading interference hypothesis, market liquidity would be 
drained and trading would not occur if price limits interfered with trading on the event day. 
The trading volume should increase substantially in subsequent days when trading is resumed, 
whereas shares in other control panels would not have such a performance. Lehmann (1989) 
suggests that when price limits interfere with the trading of stocks that hit the limits on the 
event day, impatient investors tend to trade at unfavorable prices, whereas patient investors 
will wait for prices to reach their equilibrium levels following the event day. 
  
Trading activity (TA) is measured by a market-adjusted turnover ratio, where we divide the 
daily trading volume by the daily total shares outstanding and adjust for market turnover for 
each stock j on Day t. For each day, we report the logarithmic percentage change in trading 
activity from the previous day as 
	Trading	Change ൌ ln	ሺTA୨,୲/TA୨,୲‐ଵሻ ൈ 100. 
When share prices increase, all the three stock groups experience a significant increase 
in the share turnover rate on the event day, as shown in Tables 7, 8 and 9, respectively. The 
increments are similar for both limit hitting and non-hitting stocks with over 80% increases in 
trading activities on Day 0 during the Asian financial crisis and the tranquil period. The 2008 
financial crisis on the other hand leads to 57% to 60% jumps in trading activities for the three 
groups. All the stock groups in those three different time periods experience an increase on 
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Day 1 and a decline thereafter. This implies that investors’ behavior to “go after the upward 
limit close” can only last for one trading day. 
During the Asian financial crisis, the downward price movement had the same result as 
that in the upward price movement. Trading activity increases on Day 1 and declines 
thereafter. However, the increments of the limit hitting stocks on Day 0 and 1 are not 
significantly different from the ones not hitting the limit, Stock0.9, at the 5% level. During the 
2008 financial crisis, trading activity decreases significantly on Days 0, 1, 4, and 5 and an 
almost 10% drop in trading activities is reported five days after hitting the lower limit. It 
indicates that the price limit does not interfere with the trading activity in 2008 and 2009. 
Similarly, during the tranquil period (2004 – 2006), trading activity also progressively 
declines after Day 0 and accumulated over 38% drop only three days after the limit hitting 
event. This suggests that the price limit does not interfere with trading activity in the 
downward price movement. This can be attributed to the fact that the Asian financial crisis 
does not considerably affect the Chinese stock market it was still immature and inactive in 
1997 and 1998. In sum, in the case of the lower price limit, the price limit of the Chinese 
stock market does not interfere with the trading activity. Such finding is inconsistent with the 
trading interference hypothesis of Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1989).  
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Table 7.Trading Interference Hypothesis Test in the 1997 to 1998 Stock Sample 
Stock Sample in the Asian Financial Crisis (1997 to 1998) 
Upward Price Movement  Downward Price Movement 
Day 
Window 
Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit  
Day 
Window 
Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit 
-5 4.924  6.783 > 0.588  -5 -3.191 >> -12.088  -9.567 
-4 -0.026  3.101  6.378  -4 -15.831  -16.932  -13.522 
-3 7.461  6.582  2.790  -3 23.402 >> 13.731 >> -0.217 
-2 10.186  12.111  7.895  -2 -14.185 << -10.629 << -0.345 
-1 16.685  12.456  16.411  -1 8.432  10.987  11.921 
0 86.547  87.277  83.200  0 23.284 < 31.365  33.416 
1 21.444 >> -2.371 >> -22.144  1 14.460  0.284 >> -9.434 
2 -55.052 << -46.657 >> -36.891  2 -12.751 << -2.807 >> -12.152 
3 -19.773 << -12.828  -12.904  3 9.441 >> -0.512 >> -10.396 
4 -15.342  -15.961  -10.986  4 -9.507 >> -13.451  -15.746 
5 -13.163 < -8.515  -8.210  5 -9.817  -11.698  -13.371 
Total 
Observations 
1009  1009  805  
Total 
Observations
396  709  551 
Note : Day -1 represents the day before Day 0, which is the event day of when the price limit hit. Trading 
activity is measured by a market-adjusted turnover ratio. For each day, we report the percentage change in 
trading activity from the previous day, which is defined as,	ln	ሺTA୨,୲/TA୨,୲‐ଵሻ ൈ 100. We calculate this 
percentage change for each stock j and report the daily means. >> and > indicate significantly greater than 
at the 1% and 5% significance levels respectively under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
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Table 8.Trading Interference Hypothesis Test in the 2008 to 2009 Stock Sample 
Stock Sample in the 2008 Financial Crisis (2008 to 2009) 
Upward Price Movement  Downward Price Movement 
Day Window Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit  Day Window Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit 
-5 -1.998  -1.383  -2.684  -5 2.597  1.191  0.040 
-4 2.368  1.256  3.731  -4 -2.478 < 0.081  0.607 
-3 8.388  7.808 >> 3.945  -3 12.355 > 9.249 >> 6.200 
-2 2.705  3.315  1.659  -2 2.429  0.915  1.684 
-1 11.794 >> 6.868 >> 2.023  -1 3.669 > -1.011  -1.615 
0 56.935 < 60.518 >> 57.461  0 -0.196 < 3.010 >> -0.736 
1 28.684 >> 12.465 >> -10.547  1 -16.101 >> -23.786 >> -29.699 
2 -35.694 << -32.408 << -25.154  2 2.254  2.308  1.872 
3 -15.471 << -11.683 << -4.944  3 0.672  1.250 << 4.091 
4 -0.884  -0.882  -2.077  4 -10.243 << -5.374 << -1.703 
5 -10.343 < -9.088 << -5.613  5 -9.908 << -6.589 << -0.898 
Total 
Observations 
6508  5891  3031  
Total 
Observations 
2484  5631  4009 
Note : Day -1 represents the day before Day 0, which is the event day of when the price limit hit. Trading 
activity is measured by a market-adjusted turnover ratio. For each day, we report the percentage change in 
trading activity from the previous day, which is defined as,	ln	ሺTA୨,୲/TA୨,୲‐ଵሻ ൈ 100. We calculate this 
percentage change for each stock j and report the daily means. >> and > indicate significantly greater than 
at the 1% and 5% significance levels respectively under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
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Table 9.Trading Interference Hypothesis Test in the 2004 to 2006 Stock Sample 
Stock Sample in Tranquil Period (2004 to 2006) 
Upward Price Movement  Downward Price Movement 
Day 
Window 
Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit  
Day 
Window 
Hit  0.9 Hit  0.8 Hit 
-5 1.009  2.018  -0.949  -5 3.943  3.452  2.835 
-4 4.822  6.369  6.000  -4 2.502  2.177  2.317 
-3 3.987  2.572  3.066  -3 -0.176  0.715  -1.433 
-2 6.189 > 3.147  5.940  -2 -4.397 < -0.561  -1.384 
-1 9.456  14.166  13.740  -1 3.530  2.551  4.862 
0 83.017  81.895  83.840  0 36.173  39.043  37.559 
1 25.625 >> 9.468 >> -25.793  1 -6.354 >> -26.637 >> -41.442 
2 -37.605 << -35.999 << -29.729  2 -25.794 << -24.674 << -19.940 
3 -17.650 < -16.313 << -12.606  3 -11.990 << -8.154 << -4.104 
4 -7.876  -7.452  -6.989  4 1.241  0.758 << 4.438 
5 -8.646  -8.016  -5.416  5 -4.247 << -1.571 > -4.587 
Total 
Observations 
4065  3634  2030  
Total 
Observations
1455  2759  2067 
Note : Day -1 represents the day before Day 0, which is the event day of when the price limit hit. Trading 
activity is measured by a market-adjusted turnover ratio. For each day, we report the percentage change in 
trading activity from the previous day, which is defined as,	ln	ሺTA୨,୲/TA୨,୲‐ଵሻ ൈ 100. We calculate this 
percentage change for each stock j and report the daily means. >> and > indicate significantly greater than 
at the 1% and 5% significance levels respectively under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
 
4. Stocks that Hit the Limits 
 
We will identify the characteristics of the Chinese stocks that frequently hit the price limits 
during market turmoils. Previous studies suggest that volatile stocks, actively-traded stocks, 
23 
 
and small market capitalization stocks tend to hit the price limits more frequently. For 
example, Kim and Limpaphyayom (2000) showed that volatile, actively-traded and small 
stocks are prone to hitting the price limits in Thai and Taiwanese stock markets. Chen et al. 
(2005) find that actively-traded stocks hit the limits more frequently in bearish markets in 
China. Stocks with high book-to-market values hit the upper price limits more often, while 
stocks with more tradable shares tend to hit the price limits less frequently. In our sample, a 
logit regression model for stock i is estimated as follows: 
 
݈݋݃ ൬ ݄݅ݐݏ௜1 െ ݄݅ݐݏ௜൰ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܤ݁ݐܽ௜ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܤܯ௜	൅	ߚଷ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߚସ ∗ ܴܴ௜ 
൅ߚହ ∗ ܶ ௜ܸ ൅ ߚ଺ ∗ ܵݐܽݐ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ ∗ ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
                                                              (2) 
where hitsi is the frequency of stock i hitting the price limits and is computed as the 
number of days Stock i hits the limits over the total number of trading days; 
Beta represents a measure of the stock’s correlation with the market, 
BM denotes the average book-to-market value of the stock; 
Size denotes the logarithm of the average market capitalization; 
RR is the residual risk; 
TV is the turnover ratio; 
State represents the percentage of state-owned shares over the total outstanding shares. 
Dummy is an industry dummy variable for stock i, which takes the value of 1 if the stock 
belongs to a particular industry, and 0 otherwise. Six industries (finance, utility, properties, 
conglomerates, industrial and commerce) are included. 
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We obtain the estimates of Beta and RR from the following model  
               Rit  =  1  + Rmt  + it,                              (3) 
where itR  is the excess return of Stock i and mtR  is the market excess return (index return). 
We can estimate Beta by 1  and RR by the standard deviation of the residuals.  
Table 10 shows the estimates of the model for the sample during the 2008 financial crisis. 
We also identify the different attributes in the upward and downward movements separately. 
For the whole sample and the upward and downward subsamples, the coefficients of TV 
(Turnover Ratio), Beta and the property industry dummy are significantly positive at the 1% 
level. Comparing the two subsamples shows that the marginal effects of TV, Beta, and the 
property industry dummy are larger for the upward price limit. The coefficients of Beta and 
Property industry dummy from upward limit subsample are 0.0170 and 0.00999 which are 
almost twice as large as the ones from downward limit subsample. The result suggests that an 
actively-traded stock with a higher positive correlation with the market in the property 
industry tends to hit the price limits more frequently. Note that the coefficient of the industrial 
sector dummy is significantly positive for the whole sample and the upward subsample. This 
suggests that industrial stocks are more likely to hit the upper price limits when the market 
releases positive news during market turmoils. Industrial stocks in China are mostly those 
issued by state-owned firms serving the domestic market. Therefore, they are less likely to be 
affected by the global financial crisis. 
The results also show that the coefficients of the BM value and RR are significantly 
negative at the 1% level. Such finding is consistent with those of Kim and Limphayom (2000) 
and Chen et al. (2005), where firms with a higher BM value have relatively low likelihood in 
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reaching the price limits. This is because most of them are value firms which perform steadily 
during market turmoil. We also find that the coefficient of the market size is significantly 
negative in both the whole sample and the upward subsample but not significantly positive 
for the downward price movement. This shows that larger firms are less likely in hitting 
upper price limits rather than lower limits. An explanation for this finding is that firms with 
large market sizes often have sufficient capital and stable business performance, which may 
be regarded as a low-risk investment and do not likely fluctuate markedly during market 
turmoil.  
We expect that state-owned firms will not be affected by market turmoils and these firms 
will hardly hit the price limit in the downward price movement. Note from Table 10 that the 
coefficient of state ownership is positive but not significant in all cases. This suggests that 
stocks of state-owned firms have the same chance of hitting the price limits as other firms 
during market turmoil.  
For all the three cases, stocks in the property industry are more likely to hit the price 
limits. Note also that in the upward subsample, the coefficients of conglomerates and 
industrial sector dummies are also significantly positive. However, except for property, other 
industry dummy variables are not significant in the downward subsample.  
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Table 10.GMM Estimation Results of Stocks that Hit the Limit 
Characteristics of Limit-hitting Stocks in the 2008 Financial Crisis (2008 to 2009) 
 Full Sample Upward Limit 
Subsample 
Downward Limit 
Subsample 
BM -0.0377*** -0.0269*** -0.0145*** 
State 0.00375 0.00182 0.00120 
TV 0.205** 0.260*** 0.207*** 
Size -0.00426*** -0.00287*** 0.000214 
Beta 0.0205*** 0.0170*** 0.00812*** 
RR -0.0202** -0.0190** -0.0111*** 
dummy1 
(Finance) 0.00675 0.00511 0.000159 
dummy2 
(Utilities) 0.00199 0.00287 0.000560 
dummy3 
(Properties) 0.0133
*** 0.00999*** 0.00555** 
dummy4 
(Conglomerates) 0.00502
* 0.00767*** -0.000903 
dummy5 
(Industrials) 0.00691
*** 0.00675*** 0.00126 
Constant -0.731*** -0.776*** -0.854*** 
Number of 
Stocks 1464 1433 1117 
*, **, and *** denote 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels of significance, respectively.  
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5. Conclusions 
The effectiveness of price limits has been a controversial issue in the literature. Most 
previous studies focus on tranquil periods. In light of the increasing integration of China into 
the global markets, this paper explores the effect of price limits in China during global market 
turmoils. We also examine the characteristics of Chinese stocks that frequently hit the limits. 
Some important results are obtained. First, it is found that during the 2008 financial crisis, the 
price limit system increased and prolonged the volatility significantly, especially during 
downward price movement. However, during the tranquil period, the price limit reduces the 
volatility during the downward price movement. Second, our results show that the price limit 
delays the efficient price discovery during market turmoils. Third, it is found that during the 
upward price movement, the price limit interferes with trading activities for one day after 
hitting the limits. Finally, it is found that actively-traded stocks in the property and industrial 
sectors that have a high positive correlation with the entire market tend to hit the price limits 
more frequently. Meanwhile, stocks with a higher BM value and a larger market size hardly 
hit the upper limits during market turmoils. 
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